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Recent Developments
LANDLORD AND TENANT -

Constructive Eviction In A

Multi-Apartment Complex. Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d
857, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (App. Dept., Super. Ct. 1967). The plaintiff,
a tenant in a multi-apartment building, brought suit against the defendant landlord for a deposit of one month's rent, claiming that he
had been constructively evicted from his apartment as a result of
vermin infestation.' In finding for the plaintiff, the court continued a
recent trend toward imposing increasing responsibility for the upkeep
of multiple tenant buildings on the landlord.2
At common law a construtive eviction was defined as, "[A]n
intentional act or omission of the landlord, permanently depriving the
tenant without his consent of the use and beneficial enjoyment of the
demised premises, or any substantial part thereof, so that the tenant
abandons the premises." 3 Early decisions, observing that a lease of
realty carried with it no implied warranty of habitability at common
law, held that vermin infestation was not a ground for a constructive

eviction in the absence of active wrongdoing on the part of the land-

lord.4 Judicial inroads on this rule began with the appearance of cases
holding that short term leases did include an implied warranty of
fitness for habitation.5 These cases were based on judicial recognition
of the fact that a tenant leasing realty for a short term was in no position to cope with a serious vermin problem and that for all practical
1. "[Tbo-wit psocids." 251 Cal. App. 2d 857, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 807. According to
Webster psocidae are, "[a] family of small, soft-bodied, winged insects (order Corrodentia), related to the book lice. They are widely distributed, feeding upon lichens,
fungi, and decaying vegetation." Webster's New International Dictionary 2001 (2d
ed. 1942).
The Buckner case represents a liberalization of the older concepts of what
type of vermin were a serious enough problem to justify the tenant's leaving. Rats
and bedbugs have generally been held to be sufficient. Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit,
155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050 (App. Div. 1913) (rats) ; Young v. Povich, 121
Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922) (bedbugs). However, vermin of lesser destructive capabilities have usually been held to be mere nuisances and not a serious enough problem to
justify vacating the premises. Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793
(1947) (beetles) ; Leo v. Santagada, 45 Misc. 2d 309, 256 N.Y.S.2d 511 (City Ct. of
Newberg, Orange Co. 1964) (twelve cockroaches); Golstein v. Totman, 163 Misc.
114, 297 N.Y.S. 135 (1937) (fleas); Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox, 147 Misc. 300,
263 N.Y.S. 695 (Mun. Ct. of N.Y.C. 1933) (crickets).
2. The court also held that an apparent waiver in the lease of the statutory
requirement that apartments be in a habitable condition when rented was not enforceable for two reasons. First, when construed strictly, the waiver was held to apply only
to the plaintiff's individual apartment and not to the apartment building as a whole, and
the vermin infested plaintiff's apartment from other parts of the building. Second,
the waiver was held to be void in the face of public health statutes requiring landlords
to keep their buildings in a sanitary condition. 251 Cal. App. 2d 857, 50 Cal. Rptr.
at 807.
3. G. W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON RZAL PROPERTY § 1132 (1924). See generally Rhynhart, Notes on the Law of Landlord and Tenant, 20 MD.L. Rnv. 1, 23 (1960).
4. Griffin v. Freeborn, 181 Mo. App. 203, 168 S.W. 219 (1914); Madden v.
Bullock, 115 N.Y.S. 723, 724 (App. T. 1909) (dissenting opinion) ; Jacobs v. Morand,
110 N.Y.S. 208 (App. T. 1908).
5. E.g., Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947).
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purposes the landlord was still in control of the premises. Accordingly, in Young v. Povich the highest court of Maine held that the
presence of great numbers of bedbugs in a seaside cottage leased for
eight months constituted a constructive eviction of the tenant.
The same reasoning was extended further in cases where the
tenant leased an apartment in a building in which the landlord also
resided. Control over the premises was held to remain with the landlord, and he was therefore held to be responsible for the habitability
of the building.7
With the advent of modern apartment complexes, application of
the common law rule seems even more unjustified. Obviously a single
lessee in a multi-apartment structure has little if any control over the
sanitation of the whole premises. For this reason the courts have come
under increasing pressure to hold the landlord responsible for the general condition of the building." As a result, the presence of rats and
other vermin in an apartment building in such numbers that the dwelling is rendered uninhabitable was held to be a constructive eviction.9
This rule signifies a realization that the tenant has no practicable way
of protecting himself from vermin that breed in parts of the apartment
building other than his own single apartment and that due to the fact
that the landlord retains control over those parts of the building
common to all tenants, such as halls, stairways, and basements,"0 he
is in the best position to prevent the accumulation of garbage and other
substances which attract vermin."
6. 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
7. Johnson v. Snyder, 99 Cal. App. 2d 86, 221 P.2d 164 (1950).
8. See Sax and Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MicH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
The suggestions found in this article offer the most radical solution to the problem
presented to date. It is interesting to note that eleven months prior to the decision in
Buckner an article appeared in the Stanford Law Review advocating the steps subsequently taken by the court in Buckner:
As a minimum, the landlord should be required to rent housing that is tenantable,
as defined by state or local housing regulations or by the courts. A minimum
standard of habitability would comport with the reasonable expectations of the
parties, since both the landlord and the tenant know they are bargaining about
a dwelling.
The Duty of Maintenance of Multiple Dwellings in California, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1397,
1398 (1966).
9. In Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 155 App. Div. 182, 139 N.Y.S. 1050, 1051
(1913), the court stated:
Very large numbers of people live in tenement houses, apartment houses, and
apartment hotels in this city. Such tenants have, and can have, control only of
the inside of their own limited demised premises. Conditions unknown to the
ancient common law are thus created. This requires elasticity in the application
of the principles thereof. An intolerable condition, which the tenant neither causes
nor can remedy, seems to me warrants the application of the doctrine of constructive eviction.
Accord, Building Ass'n of Duluth Odd Fellows v. Van Nispen, 220 Minn. 504, 20
N.W.2d 90 (1945) ; Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
See also Schiff v. Peck, 288 Ill. App. 625, 6 N.E.2d 509 (1937).
10. For a good discussion of this point, see Moskowitz, Landlord's Retention of
Power to Control Premises, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rpv. 579 (1966).
11. The evidence showed that the infestation came from wall, floors, ceilings and
other sections of the building and was present in other apartments. The tenant
could not by her actions in apartment 305 cure said infestations or prevent reintroduction into the premises from these outside sources. Conditions allowed to
exist in a portion of the building other than the demised premises may cause a
constructive eviction.
Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 857, ----.
P.2d __ , 59 Cal. Rpt . 806. 807 (1967)
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The development of this portion of the law of landlord and tenant
has not been accomplished without theoretical difficulties. A mere
extension of the rule of warranty of habitability found in Young v.
Povich1 2 could not solve the pressing problem of initially habitable
buildings allowed to deteriorate."8 As a result, the courts began seeking legal justification for holding landlords responsible for the general
sanitation of apartment buildings for as long as the tenant occupies
the premises. The resulting legal theories have been varied.
In Delamater v. Foreman,14 the tenant leased an apartment on
the third floor of a modern apartment building. After moving in, the
tenant was invaded by a host of bedbugs which swarmed out of cracks
in the floor. Admitting that the rule might be different had the tenant
been able to control the problem, the court ruled that in this instance
there had been a constructive eviction of the tenant. The court held
that the landlord's failure to keep the premises free from vermin
violated an "implied covenant that the premises will be habitable."' 5
Similarly, in Washington Chocolate Co. v. Kent,' the court was
presented with a case in which the tenant leased a portion of a warehouse in which to store chocolate. Some months later rats entered
his part of the building from other parts of the premises and contaminated some of the chocolate. Despite extermination efforts, the
rats continued to flourish and finally caused the tenant to leave. The
court held that the tenant had been constructively evicted as a result
of the landlord's initial failure to keep the building free from vermin.
The rather unusual justification given for this holding was that the
landlord had breached an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.'"
In a number of other cases the courts have failed to decide on any
particular covenant or implied agreement, but have held the landlord
responsible for the condition of the building because of an unspecified
"duty" to keep the premises sanitary.'
12. 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
13. As the court recognized in Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d
793, 795 (1947):
The burden was upon the tenant to show that the condition of the premises at
the time the tenancy began was such as to render them unfit for occupancy.... It
was said in Bolieau v. Traiser .. .a condition that the premises are fit for
habitation "[i]s implied only with regard to the state of the premises at the
beginning of the tenancy and does not cover defects which arise later."
14. 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931). There is no implied warranty of
habitability recognized in the State of Maryland. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co.,
176 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying Maryland law).
15. 239 N.W. at 149, Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453 (1919).
16. 28 Wash. 2d 448, 183 P.2d 514 (1947).
17. Id. at 516. Using an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment as the basis of the
decision is unusual because of the peculiar definition of this covenant. Normally a
covenant of quiet enjoyment is held to mean " . . . that the lessee will be protected
by the lessor from any interference with his possession by one claiming a paramount
title or any acts of the lessor. .

.

.

"

W. E. Stephens Mfg. Co. v. Buntin, 27 Tenn.

App. 411, 181 S.W.2d 634, 636 (1944). Apparently the court in the Washington
Chocolate case decided to extend this covenant to cover the omissions of the landlord
as well as his acts.
18. The failure of the courts to specify in these cases the exact duty owed by a
landlord makes it difficult to precisely define its limits. It appears to be a general
duty to keep the premises habitable. Building Ass'n of Duluth Odd Fellows v. Van
Nispen, 220 Minn. 504, 20 N.W.2d 90 (1945); Ben Har Holding Co. v. Fox, 147
Misc. 300, 263 N.Y.S. 695 (1933); Barnard Realty v. Bonwit 155 App. Div. 182,
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The development of this legal responsibility of apartment landlords has required some modification of the common law elements of
constructive eviction. In all of these recent cases the courts have
reached their decisions without mentioning the old, oft referred to,
requirement of an intent on the part of the landlord to evict his tenant.
Apparently, the courts have decided either that an intent to evict is
no longer required or that a landlord will be presumed to intend the
reasonably predictable results of his acts or omissions."9
In Maryland there have been only five cases dealing with the law
of constructive eviction, and in only one of these cases has the tenant
been successful."0 The only Maryland case relevant to the particular
problem under discussion is Biggs v. McCurley.21 In that case a tenant
sued his landlord for failing to make repairs on the leased house as
the terms of the lease required. The court held that a mere refusal to
make repairs on the house did not constitute a constructive eviction.
It should be noted that the Maryland Court of Appeals was not
presented with the problem of a landlord's duty to repair a building
occupied by several tenants. In Biggs, a single family dwelling was
involved, and the court's holding is therefore not inconsistent with the
decisions which have recognized a duty on the part of a landlord to
keep an apartment building sanitary.2 2
The need for protecting innocent tenants in apartment complexes
from the deterioration of the whole building has never been more
pressing than at the present time. In urban areas the apartment house
is rapidly replacing single family dwellings as the principal form of
housing. Unfortunately, the ironic fact is that the belated judicial
139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1913). Cf. State v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414
(4th Cir. 1949) (applying Maryland law). See also Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d

606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954).
13

19. For a good discussion of this point, see Constructive Eviction of a Tenant,

BAYLOR

L. Rxv. 62 (1961).

20. In Grabenherst v. Nicodemus, 42 Md. 236 (1875), the tenant leased property
on which a distillery was located for the purpose of running the distillery and producing liquor. The landlord knew of the tenant's intention to operate the distillery
prior to entry, but subsequently refused to give the tenant written consent as required
by the internal revenue statutes. As a result, the tenant was unable to lawfully operate
the distillery. The court held that the obligation to give consent was implied under
the lease and, hence, the landlord's refusal was a "constructive eviction."
In Standard Brewing Co. v. Weil, 129 Md. 487, 99 A. 661 (1916), a landlord
was held not to have constructively evicted his tenant whose saloon license was not
renewed by the Liquor License Commissioners. There was no evidence showing that
the landlord procured or instigated the refusal of the license.
In Jackson v. Birgfeld, 189 Md. 552, 56 A.2d 793 (1948), a tenant leased a
building and its equipment. The court held that an excavation by the landlord at the
rear of the building was not such an interference with the beneficial enjoyment of the
premises as to constructively evict the tenant (even though the tenant had used
the land excavated for burning trash).
In McNally v. Moser, 210 Md. 127, 122 A.2d 555 (1956), a landlord was held
not responsible for a ruling by the zoning authorities which prevented his tenant from
using the leased premises as an office. The court pointed out that the tenant had procured the zoning ruling himself as an attempt to break the lease.
21. 76 Md. 409, 25 A. 466 (1892).
22. Most of the courts holding a landlord responsible for the sanitation of his
apartment house have specifically limited their rulings to multi-tenant dwellings. See,
e.g., Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148, 149 (1931), in which the
court, while finding a constructive eviction of an apartment house tenant, stated: "The
rule at common law was that the law did not impliedly impose any such duty upon the
landlord. This rule still prevails as to the leasing of an unfurnished dwelling house."

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXVII

recognition of landlord responsibility in this area has taken a form
that fails to significantly aid a large portion of apartment dwellers.
In order to claim a constructive eviction, the tenant must actually
vacate the premises. The low income tenant living in the type of building most likely to suffer from lack of sanitation and landlord neglect
is usually in no position financially, or otherwise, to vacate his apartment and move to other quarters - assuming that he can find better
facilities. Hence those tenants who most need protection have been
given a remedy that is illusory in most cases.
There is still one logical step that needs to be taken by the courts.
In the Maryland case of Biggs v. McCurley, the court of appeals
rejected the tenant's claim of constructive eviction based on the landlord's failure to repair. However, it did find that the landlord had
breached a covenant in the lease requiring him to make repairs, and,
consequently, the court stated that the tenant was entitled to recover
the difference between the rent he agreed to pay and the fair rental
value of the property minus the agreed upon repairs. 23 The court in
that case was dealing with an express covenant in the lease. Yet if an
implied covenant of habitability or of quiet enjoyment is recognized,
a breach of either of these covenants should afford the tenant a similar
remedy to that granted in Biggs. The value of such a rule in the case
of lower income housing is obvious.
Despite the fact that some courts have used the concept of implied
covenants in reaching their decisions, it seems unlikely that they will
so rigidly apply this concept as to declare that a breach of these covenants will constructively evict his tenant in a case where the landlord
has not been at fault in regard to the arising of the pestilent condition.
The basic principles underlying the doctrine of constructive eviction
should properly be concerned with the presence of fault on the part
of the landlord. The courts in all of the cases cited above were wrestling
primarily with a determination of the proper scope of a landlord's
responsibility. However, the presence of improper acts or omissions
on the part of the landlord whether amounting to negligence or some
other degree of misconduct was discussed as if an integral element in
the decisions rendered above, and for this reason, the use by some
courts of the implied covenant concept is perhaps a bit misleading.
The appearance of statutory regulation of housing is one recent
development which will lift the ultimate resolution of this area of the
law out of the exclusive hands of the courts. In the last analysis, the
Buckner case may well be best explained on the basis of the public
health statutes of the state of California.24 Although it is difficult
to predict the future course of the law in this area, the most likely
development appears to be, as the Buckner case suggests, a blending
of statutory guidelines and common law remedies. The one thing that
is clear, however, is the determination of most courts to protect an
innocent tenant in a multi-apartment complex from the deterioration
of the premises due to his landlord's neglect.
23. 25 A. at 468.
24. CAL. ANN. HtALTH & SAFPTY CODE § 17811
corresponding statutory provisions in Maryland.

(West 1955). There are no

1967]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

RIGHT TO COUNSEL - An Indigent Is Entitled To CourtAppointed Counsel In A Habeas Corpus Proceeding Under The
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. People ex rel. Harris v. Ogilvie,
35 Ill. 2d 512, 221 N.E.2d 265 (1966). The accused was arrested in
Illinois pursuant to a rendition warrant issued by the Governor of
Illinois at the request of the Governor of Texas. He was brought
before the circuit court where he asserted he wished to contest his
detention by filing a writ of habeas corpus as provided by the Illinois
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.' He further stated that he was an
indigent and requested court-appointed counsel. The trial court refused
to appoint counsel, quashed the writ, and remanded the accused for
extradition to Texas. On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court reversed,
holding "that section 10 of the Illinois Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act, which grants to persons arrested under the act the right to demand
and procure counsel, requires that counsel be appointed to represent
indigent persons who do not have the means to procure counsel for
themselves." 2 In reaching this conclusion, which appears to be consistent with the plain meaning of the language of the statute, the court
indicated that though habeas corpus proceedings are generally held to
be civil in nature, 3 the fact that the outcome of an extradition proceeding is of great consequence to the petitioner and that legal expertise
is necessary to properly protect the rights of the petitioner required
appointment of counsel for indigents.
In deciding the case, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected two
Arizona decisions 4 holding that an indigent has no right to have counsel
appointed to represent him in extradition proceedings, because neither
involved a construction of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. The
court evidently did not consider as persuasive a recent Alabama decision5 interpreting section 10 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition
1. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 60, 1 27 (1965):
No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent
whom the Executive Authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive
him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of the circuit court
of the county wherein he is arrested who shall inform him of the demand made
for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the
right to demand and procure within a reasonable time and opportunity, not less
than 24 hours, legal counsel; and if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he
or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court shall fix
a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of
habeas corpus.
This section is identical in all pertinent respects to section 10 of the UNFORM
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION

AcT. (9 ULA,

UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT,

J 10).

2. 221 N.E.2d at 267. The court stated further that:
[Tihe statute clearly recognizes that the assistance of counsel in such proceedings
is not only important but is a "right" of the accused person. The legislature
obviously did not consider the assistance of counsel to be unimportant or nonessential.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960) and cases
cited in Cohen v. Warden, 252 F. Supp. 666 (D. Md. 1966).
4. Rugg v. Burr, 1 Ariz. App. 280, 402 P.2d 28 (1965) ; Oppenheimer v. Boies,
95 Ariz. 292, 389 P.2d 696 (1964). Contra, In re Ross, 410 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967), a decision rendered subsequent to the principal case.
5. Sullivan v. State, 181 So. 2d 518 (Ala. 1965) (case not referred to in the
opinion of principal case). Alabama has adopted section 10 of the UNIFORM CRIMINAL
EXTRADITION ACT in CODt or ALA. tit. 15, § 57 (1940) with a slight change, i.e.,
"right to demand legal counsel," omitting the word "procure." In this case petitioner

436
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Act, as adopted by that state, holding that a defendant who sought a
writ of habeas corpus in extradition proceedings did not have a statutory right to court-appointed counsel and was denied no constitutional
right to counsel by the court's failure to appoint counsel.
Maryland adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act in 1937'
and has recognized that an accused held under an extradition warrant
is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to establish, if he can, that he
is not a fugitive from justice.7 Although never facing the narrow
question in this case,' the Maryland Court of Appeals has held that
there is no statutory requirement that counsel be appointed for an indigent defendant in an application for habeas corpus.9
In the majority of jurisdictions the appointment of counsel in
habeas corpus proceedings is left to the discretion of the trial court.' °
Presently, however, debate rages over the potential extension of the
constitutional right to appointed counsel to a variety of quasi-criminal
proceedings.'1 There has been no Supreme Court case specifically
holding that an indigent petitioner has a constitutional right to appointed counsel in a habeas corpus hearing. Those who argue against
challenged the denial of the writ of habeas corpus on grounds that he was not informed
of his right to demand counsel and that the court did not appoint counsel to represent
him. Although he did not demand counsel at the hearing, the court stated that even
if petitioner had requested court-appointed counsel they would have reached the
same conclusion.
6. MD. CoDe ANN. art. 41, §§ 16-42 (1957). Section 25 gives the accused the
right "to demand and procure legal counsel."
7. Koprivich v. Warden of the Baltimore City Jail, 234 Md. 465, 200 A.2d 49
(1964). See also Willin v. Sheriff of Wicomico County, 201 Md. 667, 95 A.2d 87
(1953); Audler v. Kriss, 197 Md. 362, 79 A.2d 391 (1951).
8. But see Bagley v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary (Crim. Ct. Baltimore City,
Jan. 8, 1964), in 152 Daily Record, Baltimore, vol. 41, at 3 (1964), where the judge
indicated that petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding contesting extradition might
successfully contend he had the right to demand and procure counsel and possibly a
right to appointed counsel.
9. Plater v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 220 Md. 673, 154 A.2d 811
(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 955 (1959). See generally Manning v. State, 237 Md.
349, 206 A.2d 563 (1965) and MD. R.P. 719(b) (2).
10. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1962); Dillon v. United States, 307
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962). But cf. Comment, Right to Counsel In Federal Collateral
Attack Proceedings: Section 2255, 30 U. Cai. L. R.v. 583, 591 (1963), where this
view is expressed:
The drawback inherent in leaving appointment of counsel within the discretion
of the trial court, without saying more, is that no standards are advanced by
which the trial court can employ its discretion. Similarly, the appellate courts
are left without criteria for considering the possible abuse of the trial court's
discretion.
11. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where due process guarantees extended to
juvenile proceedings in which commitment may result; People v. Breese, 34 Il. 2d
61, 213 N.E.2d 500 (1966), where it was held that defendant had a right to courtappointed counsel in a "sexually dangerous person proceeding" which resulted in civil
commitment; People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill. 2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625 (1965), where it
was held that an indigent petitioner, upon filing an application for discharge from
commitment, should have the benefits of court-appointed counsel because the proceedings might result in a deprivation of liberty; People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley,
17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966), where it was held that
an indigent mental patient who was committed to an institution was entitled, in a
habeas corpus proceeding brought to establish his sanity, to assignment of counsel
as a matter of constitutional right; People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d
670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965), where the court held that a defendant charged with a
traffic infraction, a petty offense, had no statutory or constitutional rights to appointment of counsel. The court expressed the view that the practical result of assigning
counsel to a defendant in traffic cases would be chaotic.
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such an extension stress that the constitutional guarantee to the assistance of counsel as provided in the sixth amendment does not apply to
such proceedings12 because habeas corpus hearings have been classified
as civil rather than criminal in nature, and, therefore, standards of
fair criminal procedure are said not to apply.3 Perhaps the strongest
argument against extension of the right is that an overwhelming number of habeas corpus petitions are frivolous and the burden of free legal
aid would be substantial. 4 However, the current practice in both the
federal and state courts is to appoint counsel, especially where the issues
presented require an ability to organize factual data or to elicit testimony in a logical and orderly fashion, and thus the constitutional
question is likely to remain unresolved by the Supreme Court, at least
for the present. 15

TORTS - Passenger's Failure To Use Available Seat Belt Not
Contributory Negligence. Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230
A.2d 629 (1967). The plaintiff, a guest in the defendant's car, sued
to recover for injuries sustained in a collision. The plaintiff claimed
she had been thrown into the air, had broken the rear view mirror with
her forehead, and had cut her cheek on the dashboard on the glass
which had fallen there. Although the car contained a seat belt, the plaintiff was not using it at the time of the accident. The defendant offered
no expert testimony or other proof that the plaintiff's injuries were
either caused or aggravated by her failure to use the seat belt. The trial
court refused to charge the jury that if they found that the plaintiff was
not using an available seat belt at the time of the accident and that
its use would have prevented the resulting injuries, then the plaintiff
would be guilty of contributory negligence which would preclude recovery. In requesting this instruction, the defendant was apparently
relying on a Maryland statute which required installation of seat belts
in front seats of cars after June 1, 1963.' The trial judge made no
mention of seat belts in his charge and instructed the jury that "as a
matter of law" there was no evidence in the case "legally sufficient to
prove that ... (the plaintiff) . . . was guilty of any negligence con12. La Clair v. United States, 35 U.S.L.W. 2423 (C.A. 7 Jan. 11, 1967). This
argument ignores the possible guarantee of counsel embodied in the due process provision of the fifth amendment.
13. United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960). But see Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961), where the Court rejected the "civil classification"
of habeas corpus proceedings as determinative of the petitioner's rights in those proceedings: "The availability of a procedure to retain liberty lost through criminal
process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels."
14. See generally Application for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction
Review of Sentences in the United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1963).
15. Commonwealth ex rel. Bell v. Russell, 422 Pa. 232, 220 A.2d 632 (1966);
accord, United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707, 715 (2d Cir. 1960). See R. SOKOL,
A HANDBOOK ov FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus 71-73 (1965).
1. MD.Cong ANN. art. 66Y2, § 296(a) (1967).
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tributing to her injuries." 2 From a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
affirmed, holding that it is not negligence per se to fail to use a seat
belt where the statute requires only its installation in the vehicle and
that failure to use the seat belt, standing alone, is not sufficient to
support a finding of contributory negligence. The meaning of its second
holding was indicated by the court's statement that it might later be
required to consider whether the issue should be submitted to the jury
in a case "in which the availability of the belt will be known to the
plaintiff and in which there will be evidence indicating that failure to
use it was a substantial factor in producing or aggravating the plaintiff's
injuries."'
Defendant's argument on appeal was not that failure to use seat
belts was per se negligence, but rather that the Maryland statute,
which requires installation, though not use, of seat belts, indicates a
legislative opinion that they are " a worthwhile safety device" and that
failure to use them is "some evidence of contributory negligence." 4
The court has apparently rejected even this argument and indicated
that the statute should not be submitted to the jury as evidence of the
standard of care. The court quoted extensively from a recent Wisconsin
case, Bentzler v. Braun.5 While the Wisconsin court agreed on the
significance of the statute, it went on to say that independent of any
statutory mandate, "there is a duty, based on the common law standard
of ordinary care, to use available seat belts."6 The Maryland court
refused to go that far, reasoning that mere statistical proof of the
effectiveness of seat belts in reducing injuries does not justify a court's
imposition of a legal duty to use them in the absence of knowledge
and acceptance of those statistics by the ordinary reasonable man. The
court indicated that it was not convinced that such knowledge and
acceptance exist at the present time. 7 The court was quite explicit
2. Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629, 631 (1967).
3. Id. at 227, 230 A.2d at 635.
4. Id. at 221, 230 A.2d at 632.
5. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967), in which the plaintiff passenger,
injured while not wearing an available seat belt, was found not contributorily negligent
because there was no evidence with respect to the effect of her failure to wear a seat
belt. The Wisconsin court agreed that a study of the legislative history and the fact
that the legislation required seat belts only in the front seats indicated that the statute
did not require use by implication. See Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile
Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288 (1967). The Maryland court quoted the discussion
of this point from the Wisconsin court's decision. 247 Md. at 223-26, 230 A.2d at 633-34.
6. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967). In support of its conclusion, the
Wisconsin court referred, at 639-40, to the statistics collected in Defense Memo,
7 FOR rlr DtrzNst (Feb. 1966), as well as other publications. The former included
a study by the San Diego, California, police department indicating that "in a period
when 282 motorists were injured and eight killed: Seat belts would have saved five
lives. They would have prevented 49% (139) of the injuries, lessened 21% (60),
and lessened or prevented 9% (26). In 6% (14), they would have had an unknown
effect, and no effect in 15% (43) of the cases."
The Wisconsin court found it obvious that "on the average, persons using
seat belts are less likely to sustain injury, and, if injured, the injuries are likely to be
less serious," and said that "as a matter of common knowledge, an occupant of an
automobile either knows or should know of the additional safety factor produced by
the use of seat belts."
7. The court refused to adopt the Wisconsin court's view that an occupant of a
car either knows or should know of the value of safety belts. It preferred the view,
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in stating that the instant case did not require a holding on whether
failure to wear a seat belt should have been submitted to the jury on
the issue of contributory negligence.'
Over the past few years, with the increase in legislation requiring
installation of seat belts 9 and mounting statistical proof of their
effectiveness,' ° defendants have begun to press the courts to recognize
the failure to use available seat belts as a defense in negligence cases.
Three appellate decisions considered the question in 1966," which
was the first year that cases raising the question were decided on
that level.'" In 1967, as of this writing, there have been at least three
expressed in a recent law review note, that "in spite of overwhelming scientific evidence supporting the beneficial results of seat belt use, acceptance of the safety belt
by the public has not been achieved. The social utility of wearing a seat belt must be
established in the mind of the public before failure to use a seat belt can be held to
be negligence. Otherwise the court would be imposing a standard of conduct rather
than applying a standard accepted by society." 247 Md. at 226, 230 A.2d at 635,
quoting Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. Rtv. 288,
297 (1967) (emphasis supplied by the court).
To the extent that use is an indication of knowledge and acceptance, recent
statistics support the view of the Maryland court. It is estimated that, on the average,
seat belts available to occupants are being used less than half of the time. National
Safety Council, Accident Facts 53 (1967). See also 16 AM. JUR. PROO: OF FACTS 355,
366 (1965).
8. 247 Md. at 227, 230 A.2d at 635. The court said:
Some future case in which the availability of the belt will be known to the
plaintiff and in which there will be evidence indicating the failure to use it was
a substantial factor in producing or aggravating the plaintiff's injuries may require
us to consider holding that the issue, with proper instructions, ought to be submitted to a jury. This case does not require it and we do not so hold.
9. In 1964, according to Nolan, Motor Vehicles - A Comparative Analysis of
Seat Belt Legislation, 14 DE PAUL L. Rnv. 152 (1964), there were 23 state statutes.
By 1966, 33 states had enacted legislation. See 16 Dz PAUL L. Rlv. 521 (1966). The
National Traffic Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381, providing, in § 1392,
for the setting up of appropriate federal safety standards by the Secretary of Commerce, was enacted in 1966. For a tabulation of state statutes, see Walker & Beck,
Seat Belts and the Second Accident, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 349 (1967).
10. See National Safety Council, Accident Facts 53 (1967), which states: "Additional information on the value of seat belts . . . indicates that if all passenger cars occupants used seat belts all the time, such use would save 8,000 to 10,000 lives annually."
For a summary of studies which have been made on seat belts, see Note, Seat Belt
Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. Rgv. 288, 292-93 (1967). Included
are studies on ejection (ratio of persons ejected is five times greater than those who
stayed in car), on effectiveness of seat belts in all types of accidents (reduce fatalities
about 35% and all types of injuries 60%), on proportion of fire and submersion accidents in which seat belts might increase the danger (very slight), and on the extent
to which seat belts cause abdominal and other such injuries (seat belt not significant
cause of such injuries). See also note 5 supra.
11. All of these cases were actions by guest passengers. In Sams v. Sams, 247
S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966), the court reversed the trial court's order which
struck that part of the answer alleging contributory negligence. In Brown v. Kendrick,
192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1966), on the other hand, the court affirmed the trial court's
upholding of a motion to strike that part of defendant's answer which raised as a
defense the failure to use a seat belt. In Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind.
1966), an action for loss of an eye and other injuries suffered when the plaintiff struck
the rear view mirror, the court sustained a judgment for the plaintiff, rejecting
defendant's theory of avoidable consequences on the facts of that case. The court
reasoned that it was up to the trial court, which had heard the case without a jury,
to decide how much weight to give the testimony of defendant's safety expert
on causation.
12. Prior to that year there were some significant lower court decisions. See, e.g.,
Stockinger v. Dunisch, Circ. Ct. Sheboygan Co., Wisconsin, 1964, reported in 5 FOR
THE DEFENSE 79 (1964), in which a jury found that the plaintiff was negligent in not
wearing a seat belt and deducted 10% from her damages.
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more.13 In none of these cases did the court regard failure to wear a
seat belt as negligence per se based on a statutory standard of use
by implication, nor has any court gone so far as to call it negligence
as a matter of law based on a court-imposed duty. 4 On the question
of failure to wear a seat belt as evidence of negligence, the courts
are divided. The Wisconsin court, in Bentzler v. Braun, 5 concluded
that there is a duty to use a seat belt and that in cases where a causal
relationship has been shown it is proper and necessary to instruct the
jury in that regard.'" Three of the courts left the question open for
the present. The Indiana court, in Kavanagh v. Butorac,x7 and the
Maryland court in the instant case have decided to postpone consideration of the question and to await a case in which proof of causation
will be present, thereby making it necessary to reach the question of
negligence. The South Carolina court, in Sams v. Sams, i" refused to
strike a part of an answer alleging seat belt contributory negligence,
reasoning that the question should be considered and decided at the
trial in the light of all the attendant facts and circumstances. Two
courts have clearly refused to consider failure to use seat belts as
evidence of negligence. The Delaware court refused to admit evidence
on the question in Lipscomb v. Diamiani,'9 thereby following the
reasoning of the Florida court in Brown v. Kendrick2" that the question
13. Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967) ; Bentzler v. Braun,
34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). In Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914
(Del. 1967), the court ruled that the testimony of an accident expert, which tended
to prove that if the plaintiff had used the available seat belt she would not have been
injured to as great an extent, was inadmissible. For a recent annotation on the seat
belt cases, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 1428 (1967).
14. The negligence per se argument was expressly rejected in Bentzler v. Braun,
34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967) and in the instant case, Cierpisz v. Singleton,
247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967). Negligence as a matter of law was rejected in
Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 1966).
15. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
16. In concluding that there is a duty to use a seat belt, it should be pointed out
the question of contributory negligence continues to be a jury question. The following
instruction is now used in Wisconsin:
In passing on the question as to whether or not
was
negligent, you may take into consideration the facts that the automobile was
equipped with safety belts and that they were available for use by him.
You will determine, under all the credible evidence and reasonable inferences
from the evidence in this case whether the failure of
to use the safety belt was an omission to take a precaution for his safety, and
amounted, under the circumstances, to a failure on his part to exercise ordinary
care for his own safety.
The above instructions were quoted in Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914,
917 (Del. 1967).
Prior to the Wisconsin decision, a California appellate court had already
,decided that failure to equip vehicles with seat belts (at a time when it was not
required by statute) could be a violation of the common law standard of care. In
Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1966), an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover for the death of an employee who was
-thrown from a railroad truck which was not equipped with seat belts, the court said
that a jury question was presented.
17. 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 1966).
18. 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
19. 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967).
20. 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
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is one of a highly controversial nature and therefore should be resolved
by the legislature. 2'
Even if it is decided by a jury or a court that reasonable care
requires use of seat belts, the cases suggest that the showing of causation may be difficult. In none of the appellate cases involving seat
belt contributory negligence has the required causal connection been
adequately proved. In these and other seat belt cases, however, the
courts have indicated the type of proof which would satisfy the requirement. The defendant should call upon an expert witness to testify on
the effectiveness of seat belts in general and on the effect which the
wearing of a seat belt would have had in the instant case, 22 and the
expert should be a person
who has actually participated in seat belt
23
or accident research.
21. Both courts gave other reasons for their rejection, among them the view
that seat belts are still controversial and that proof of their effectiveness in particular
cases would necessarily be "conjectural." In addition, Delaware viewed the Wisconsin
standard in which the failure to use a seat belt is to be considered in connection with
the particular circumstances as too indefinite and difficult to apply.
22. It is clear that a mere showing of the nature of the injuries and the way in
which they occurred will not be enough, even if it appears obvious to the layman that
a seat belt would have made a difference. The court required more proof in the
Cierpiss case even thought the facts in that case were particularly conducive to a finding
that failure to wear a seat belt at least aggravated the injuries. The plaintiff had
testified as follows in Cierpisz:
Q. Now, can you tell us what, if anything, happened to you in the collision?
A. Well, yes. As Mr. Bergman's car struck our car, I was thrown up into the
air and my, the left side of my forehead struck the rear view mirror and broke
it and as I came back down, my face came down on the dashboard where the glass
had fallen, and I was on the floor up on my knees on the dashboard like this
(indicating).
Brief for Appellant at E. 17, Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967).
Even the Wisconsin court, which was receptive to the notion of seat belt contributory
negligence, required a specific showing of causation where the plaintiff was apparently thrown forward and received severe facial and other injuries. While it is conceivable that the court would accept the testimony of a layman, (the Maryland and
Wisconsin courts complained of the lack of expert or other testimony), it seems
unlikely that such proof would be sufficient in view of the courts' understandable
reluctance to speculate in this area. So skeptical are the courts that even expert testimony may not convince them. In Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 1966),
the defendant suffered the loss of an eye when colliding with the rear view mirror.
The defendant submitted the testimony of an expert on safety who conducted certain
tests on a similar vehicle and testified that in his opinion the plaintiff would not have
collided with the rear view mirror if his seat belt had been properly fastened. The
court pointed out that the variables in "properly fastened" and the fact that only a
few inches separate the head of a seat belt user from the mirror make such opinion
testimony speculative; it therefore concluded that "this is an opinion which the trial
judge was at liberty to regard favorably or disregard utterly." 221 N.E.2d at 830.
23. Two seat belt cases which do not involve contributory negligence are most
helpful in showing what the courts will probably require. In Mortensen v. Southern
Pacific Co., 53 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1966), where the plaintiff was thrown from a railroad
truck which was not equipped with seat belts, the court found that sufficient evidence
had been presented on causation for the case to be submitted to a jury. A physicist
with long experience in investigation of auto accidents, along with two experienced
highway patrolmen, testified on seat belt effectiveness in general and showed photographs to prove that in this particular accident the cab was not sufficiently crushed
to have killed the decedent if he had not been ejected. Also persuasive was the comparison of the injuries of the middle occupant, who remained in the car, with those
on the outside. Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 S.W.2d 5
(1962), was an action for personal injuries allegedly resulting from the breaking of
a seat belt. The defendant submitted the testimony of a highly qualified expert on
safety and protection to the effect that the seat belt had been subjected to a greater
impact than it could be expected to sustain. Plaintiff's "expert" was an ordinary civil
engineer, and the court was not at all impressed with his qualifications.
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As cases arise in which there is adequate proof of proximate
cause, the courts will be forced to decide whether failure to use an
available seat belt can be contributory negligence. The issue is particularly difficult in jurisdictions such as Maryland where contributory
negligence is a complete defense,24 as opposed to those which, like
Wisconsin," have a comparative negligence doctrine. Although the
question was not presented in Cierpisz, a finding of contributory negligence should only bar or mitigate a recovery for personal injuries and
should not bar a recovery for property damage since there is no causal
relation between the failure to use a seat belt and the damage to the
plaintiff's vehicle.2" Furthermore, it seems unduly harsh to totally
deny recovery for personal injuries to a plaintiff whose failure to wear
a seat belt was not a proximate cause of the accident itself and may
have merely aggravated injuries that would have been suffered even
if he had been wearing a seat belt. Such harshness, it has been suggested, might be avoided by applying the doctrine of avoidable consequences.2 While this doctrine has ordinarily been applied only to
those consequences which could have been avoided by proper conduct
after the occurrence of the accident,2 it would seem that justice
would be well served by a ruling that the doctrine may also be applied
where the plaintiff's negligence took place before the accident in cases
where a logical basis for apportioning the damages to separate causes
can be found. 9
24. E.g., Miller v. Mullenix, 227 Md. 229, 176 A.2d 203 (1961); Bull Steamship Lines v. Fisher, 196 Md. 519, 77 A.2d 142 (1950). This consideration may have
partially brought about the court's apparent reluctance to accept use of the belts as
part of the standard of care.
25. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958).
26. See 12 S.D.L. Rev. 130, 134-36 (1967).
27. Id. at 139.
28. For an application of the avoidable consequences doctrine to negligence cases
in Maryland, see Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 143 Md. 264, 138 A. 1 (1927), in
which the plaintiff was not allowed to recover for that part of his suffering and
disability which he could have prevented by submitting to a simple operation.
29. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (3d ed. 1964). In Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d
824, 830 (Ind. 1966), the defendant urged avoidable consequences, but the court
rejected the argument, though it did recognize the possibility of the doctrine's application to a fact situation where the causal relationship between some part of the injuries
and the failure to use a seat belt would be clearly proven.

